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In 2015, the last year for which we have complete Canadian data, workers'
compensation boards recognized that 852 Canadian workers died from
work-related injuries and diseases and 232,629 workers experienced disab
ling injuries requiring them to take time off work. About 13 percent of those
injured will have permanent disabilities of varying severity.1 These figures
significantly underestimate the true burden of work-related disability for at
least three reasons. First, the percentage of the paid Canadian workforce
covered by workers' compensation has been shrinking. In 2008, it was esti
mated to stand at about 80 percent, although coverage bounced back to
about 85 percent in 2015.2 Second, there is widespread evidence of claims
suppression and underreporting of lost-time injuries. A 2014 review esti
mated that workers do not claim 20 percent of their injuries and illnesses
and that employers do not report 7-8 percent of injuries, misreport 3-9 per
cent of lost-time injuries as non-lost-time injuries, and actively suppress
some inestimable number of eligible claims. 3 Finally, for a claim to be re
corded it must be accepted by the compensation board, and there is evi
dence that compensation boards are rejecting claims more frequently. For
example, in Ontario, the percentage of denied claims increased from 4 per
cent in 2001 to 8 percent in 2010.4
But even if the current official toll of death, disease, and injury signifi
cantly underestimates its true incidence, the situation today is likely as
good as it has been since the rise of industrial capitalism, which has tal<en
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a terrible toll on workers' bodies. 5 It is not surprising, therefore, that regu
lating hazardous working conditions and compensating workers who suf
fered disabling work-related injuries were among the earliest working-class
demands and among the first to be addressed by protective labour laws.
Yet despite widespread recognition that it is unacceptable for workers to be
killed and injured because of dangerous work and that compensation must
be paid to those who are, conflict over health and safety and workers' com
pensation laws regularly recurs. The goal ofthis chapter is to explore the
theory and politics of recurring regulatory dilemmas in labour law and to
examine a few key moments in the history of workers' compensation, which
illustrate why these conflicts are endemic and so intractable.

TheTheory
andPolitics
ofRegulatory
Dilemmas
inLabour
Low
In capitalism, workers commodify their time and capacity to work by selling
it on labour markets to employers. In theory, the terms and conditions of
employment contracts are the product of negotiation and are mutually ac
ceptable. From the perspective of capital, labour is an ordinary commodity,
bought and sold in labour markets just as other commodities are bought
and sold in other commodity markets. But labour power is not an ordinary
commodity, as unlike, say, steel beams it cannot be separated from its seller,
who retains agency over its use even after its sale. Moreover, labour power
is not produced for the market in response to market demand but is socially
reproduced outside the market. When the commodification of labour
threatens the well-being of workers, materially or psychologically, or under
mines the conditions of social reproduction, resistance is likely to ensue.
The conflict between the drive to commodify workers' capacity to work and
resistance to its dysfunctional and harmful consequences produces an en
during if uneven commodification-decommodification dialectic, which is a
central insight of the work of both Marx and Polanyi.6
For Marx,. problems arise principally after the transaction is complete.
As hefamously put it, workers, having freely sold their labour power (their
"hide") in the labour market, follow the capitalist into the hidden abode of
production, where they can expect nothing but a hiding.7 Workers discover
that the commodification of their labour power results in their legal sub
ordination to their employers, who are driven to maximize their output in
order to extract surplus value and maximize profits. For Marx, the reten
tion of surplus value (the difference between the value of what is produced
and what the worker is paid) by the employer constitutes exploitation. At
certain points in time, workers view this exploitation of their labour power,
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and the laws that enable or tolerate it, as normatively unfair, and they re
sist it at the point of production and/or through political action, producing
a commodification-decommodification dialectic driven by the politics of
class conflict. 8
A variation of the Marxist account contemplates some situations in
which class collaboration may emerge within this dialectic. Erik Olin
Wright identifies situations in which worker organization reaches a suf
ficient level of strength that prevents employers from dominating the
class-conflict game, imposes intolerably high costs of conflict, or actu
ally assists employers in overcoming their own collective action problems
that, if resolved, would leave employers better off as a class. Under these
circumstances, a politics of class cooperation may develop in regard to
particular issues. Such cooperation does not change the underlying struc
tural conditions of the commodification-decommodification dialectic, but
it does allow for a different kind of politics to emerge in response to it, a
politics of class cooperation. 9
From a Polanyian perspective, the fictive nature oflabour as a commod
ity also arises from the fact that labour is not produced for the market. But
for Polanyi, the dysfunctional consequences oflabour's commodification do
not emerge principally in the hidden abode of production but rather in the
threat commodification poses to social reproduction, as norms of reciproc
ity and redistribution are replaced by the pursuit of self-interest without
regard to others. In a similar vein, Nancy Fraser has recently discussed
what she characterizes as the background conditions that make capitalism
possible. These include social reproduction, the earth's ecology, and politi
1
cal power. °From a Polanyian/Fraser perspective, the unbridled commodi
fication of labour and its subordination to market forces creates existential
threats to society and, in Polanyi's famous formulation, produces a counter
or double-movement that, if successful, results in the partial decommodi
fication of labour by re-embedding the market in the social. Although Po
lanyi does not have a clear theory of how this will occur, his theoretical
framework suggests that a broader coalition of social forces, potentially
including some employers, will emerge to produce this countermovement.
Fraser writes of "boundary struggles" to defend human or social reproduc
tion from economic production that are not only driven by functionalist im
peratives but are also informed by norms and social practices indigenous to
non-economic spheres. As a result, class is not the only level at which strug
gle over the commodification-decommodification dialectic occurs; rather,
multiple sets of actors enter the fray under the banner of diverse norms.
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Although there are important differences in Polanyi and Fraser's perspec
tives, their analyses lead to a common conclusion that the dialectic may be
driven by a broader-based politics that draws on norms of social solidarity.
For simplicity's sake, we will call this the politics of social protection.
Workers' compensation is an excellent case for exploring the politics of
the commodification-decommodification dialectic and how that politics has
unfolded over time. From the beginning of industrial capitalism, work inju
ries have proven to be particularly problematic, as they illustrate in the most
dramatic way possible the inability to separate labour power from the work
er who sold it; when a worker is injured or killed at work, it is not just the
worker's labour power that is damaged or destroyed but the human being.
Moreover, in a social formation in which unwaged dependants rely on the
income of a waged worker, those dependants also suffer the consequences
of work-related disabilities and deaths, both economically (the loss of access
to the wage and the increased cost of care) and personally. These devastat
ing losses explain why struggles to prevent work injuries and to compensate
injured workers began with the rise of industrial capitalism, which set the
dialectic in motion and has kept it in play.
Because the commodification-decommodification dialectic is a struc
tural feature of capitalist relations of production, it is endemic as long as
those relations exist. However, conflict is not constant, and its development
and the forms it takes are contingent on a wide range of historically specific
factors, which we will look at more closely when we turn from theory to
history. However, it wiU be helpful first to distinguish between two ideal
types of conflict. The first challenges the commodity status of labour and
is typically based on normative claims grounded outside the market. "Our
health is not for sale" is a slogan that captures this ethos. The second ac
cepts the commodity status of labour and draws on norms rooted within
the market. Claims from within labour market norms might take the form
of a demand for higher wages or a higher wage replacement rate for injured
workers. Of course, these are ideal types, and in the messy reality of work
ers' compensation struggles the lines between the two kinds of claims are
often blurred. For example, from one perspective a claim for full compensa
tion for a partially disabled worker to continue until the worker is able to
find employment might be viewed as a purely economic demand, which em
ployers resist because of its cost. However, the demand may also be fuelled
by a deep sense of injustice about being treated as a disposable commodity,
and employer resistance may be driven by a concern that full compensation
would partially decommodify labour by enabling injured workers to remain
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out of the labour market. Despite these complications, the distinction is an
alytically useful for understanding and interpreting the history and politics
of workers' compensation struggles.

History
oftheCommodification-Decommodificafion
Dialectic
inWorkers'
Compensation
A full history of this dialectic in workers' compensation is beyond the scope
of this chapter and so instead it focuses on a few key moments and issues:
the creation of a contract-based compensation regime and the shift to the
tort regime and then the no-fault regime, followed by an overview of the
recurring conflict over the compensation of workers with permanent dis
abilities within the no-fault regime.
It was not until the nineteenth century that workers and their families
first began suing their employers for work-related disabilities and fatalities.
While the earliest case concerned a boy employed in a mercantile setting,
soon thereafter the litigation was dominated by adult male workers em
ployed in industries at the core of the first Industrial Revolution, including
railways and factories. Because there was no legal precedent for these
claims, common law judges were left to develop the guiding principles and
in so doing opted for a contract regime rooted in market liberalism. In a
string of cases, beginning with Priestly v Fowler in 1837 and crisscrossing
the Atlantic, judges fashioned the legal presumption that workers volun
tarily assumed the risk of injury from hazards that were known or ought to
have been known to be present in the workplace, including the risk of injury
from the negligence of fellow servants. 11 The reason for adopting this pre
sumption was market economics. Workers would "naturally" demand high
er wages to incur risks and so it was legally presumed that in their contracts
of employment they agreed to incur the risk of injuries from hazards known
to be present in the workplace in exchange for the wages they were paid.
Therefore, they were not entitled to further compensation if those risks ma
terialized in disabling injuries. The same result was reached even if the court
acknowledged that the old master and servant law implied a duty of care on
the part of employers. In a liberal market economy, the implied terms of em
ployment contracts washed away older duties arising from status relations. 12
The creation of this regime can be understood through the lens of the
politics of class conflict, although it was a pretty one-sided affair, skewed
heavily towards employers, occurring at a time when workers generally had
little organizational or political power. Although the judges responsible for
selecting the model might not have seen themselves as acting in class terms,
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they were not naive about what they were doing. They were ideologically
committed to the individualistic or laissez-faire outlook that predominated
among men of their class at the time. They embraced the view that labour
13
should be treated as a commodity, no different in principle than any other.
Canadian common law judges slavishly followed English precedent, giving it
14
full effect while revealing little of their own thoughts on the law.
The contract model served employers' interests well; it made the cost of
hazardous working conditions low and fairly certain by effectively relieving
employers of any legal obligation to compensate injured workers. Workers
were ill served by the model, which deprived them of access to post-injury
compensation. Moreover, because most workers lacked the bargaining pow
er to command significant risk premiums, employers had little incentive to
reduce hazards. However, the certainties that the model produced helped to
concentrate and make visible the respective and contradictory interests of
workers and employers and also attracted the attention of some reformers
who became concerned about its impact on child and female labour in fac
tories and its adverse effects on social reproduction. Such concerns created
space for the politics of class conflict and social protection.
The widespread perception among reformers and workers that it was
unfair to expose workers to hazardous conditions and to not compensate
them when injuries materialized led them to demand reforms soon after the
contract model was entrenched. Both class and social protection politics
drove occupational health and safety (OHS) reform. For workers, the rosy
image of the labour market as a realm of freedom was, in this regard, a lie;
they experienced hazardous work as an imposition rather than as a choice.
Social reformers, on the other hand, were much more concerned that the
unrestrained pursuit of profit was creating physical and moral dangers that
were interfering with the reproduction of the next generation. Darcy Ber
gin, a Conservative member of Parliament, spoke to these concerns in sup
port of protective factory legislation he introduced in 1885: "The future of
the children is in our hands ... their health, their life, their faith and their
morals are at stake ... that they may not become holocausts on the altar of
mammon - these are among the objects of this Bill:'15
England enacted protective labour law before Canada did, and that often
set a precedent followed in this country. In the area of work-injury com
pensation, workers in England successfully lobbied for legislation in 1880
that provided workers with a statutory claim for compensation from their
employers if they could establish that their injuries were the result of em
ployer negligence, making tort rather than contract the underlying basis for
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compensation. However, if the worker pursued a statutory claim, recovery
was limited to a maximum of three years' wages, even in the case of a fatal
16
ity. Developments in Ontario took a slightly different route, but reached
the same result. In 1881, the Ontario legislature enacted the Railway Ac
cidents Act (RAA). The preamble signalled dissatisfaction with the results
of the contractual model: "Whereas frequent accidents to railway servants
and others are occasioned by the neglect of railway companies to provide
reasonable measures of protection against their occurrence:' The Act then
went on to set standards for railway construction and maintenance and al
lowed workers injured as a result of violations to sue as if they were not
employees. The effect was that workers could make tort-like claims for these
injuries because the contractual presumption of voluntary assumption of
risk was removed.17 Five years later, under pressure from a revived trade
union movement led by the Knights of Labor and facing more workers at
the polls as a result of amended election laws, the Ontario government fol
lowed England's lead and enacted the Workman's Compensation for Injuries
Act (WCIA), bringing in the negligence model of liability for work injuries. 18
The creation of a tort-based regime of compensation was a departure
from market voluntarism insofar as it gave workers a nonwaivable right to
sue for injuries resulting from employer negligence, but it did little to de
commodify labour power. Damages were measured by the injured worker's
lost income, capped by a three-year limit, if the worker chose to sue under
the statute, but without a minimum entitlement independent of income
19
level. In short, the change affected how labour power was priced and com
pensated but hardly touched its commodity status.
While the creation of the WCIA/tort regime can be understood chiefly
as the product of class conflict, the shift from tort to no-fault workers' com
pensation is better explained by a politics of class cooperation, with class
conflict playing a secondary role~The starting point of the story is the failure
of the tort regime to stabilize the regulatory dilemmas of market liberalism.
Although the tort model allowed some workers to obtain some compensa
tion some of the time, numerous problems remained. For the majority of
injured workers, who did not have access to private benefit plans,2° their
first recourse was to seek compensation directly from their employer. While
some employers may have paid compensation voluntarily, benevolence was
in limited supply and workers would have to sue and prove negligence in
order to recover damages. Where employers purchased employer liability
insurance, as a number of large employers did, any claims would have been
referred to the insurer, who had a direct pecuniary interest in minimizing
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payouts. Here workers often faced delay or received settlement offers sig
nificantly below their legal entitlement, which might be accepted because
of economic duress. If no settlement were reached, the employee might
sue, but this was risky because the downside could be crushing; if the suit
failed, not only would the worker be left without compensation, but he or
she would be liable to pay the legal costs of the employer as well as his or her
own. Even if the worker were successful in the initial action, the employer/
insurer might appeal, resulting in further delay and more legal costs. As a
result, many workers were left dependent on scarce family resources or on
the community at large through charity or municipal welfare where it was
available. Thus, compensation for work-related disability remained highly
uncertain even after the WCIA.
The tort model also had considerable drawbacks for employers. While
the outcome of litigation was less certain than it had been under the
contract model, Ontario judges seemed almost relieved not to adminis
ter the contract regime, and they implemented the WCIA in the spirit in
which it was enacted. 21 The effect was to increase employers' liability for
work injuries, making their cost a greater concern. Some employers pur
chased employer liability insurance, but it is doubtful that insurance mar
kets were sufficiently developed to provide coverage for small employers
and, in any event, the practices of insurance companies in resisting claims
created ill-will between injured workers and employers. This concern in
creased in the first decade of the twentieth century as a result of deepening
class divisions and the growing popularity of socialist and radical ideology.
In addition, employers were unhappy about the perceived inefficiency of
private insurance because the proportion of premiums paid in benefits to
injured workers was low relative to the high commissions paid to brokers
22

and the large costs of defending claims.
As a result, employers had a collective interest in an alternative to the
tort model, one that compensated injured workers regardless of fault,
provided that it would neither significantly increase their costs nor put
them at a competitive disadvantage. A public insurance scheme based on
mandatory participation and collective employer liability, at least within in
dustry groups, could go a long way towards meeting these concerns by tak
ing compensation costs out of competition and allowing them to be passed
on to the consumer. This was certainly the view of William Meredith, who
headed the commission appointed by the Ontario government to study the
problem and whose report proposed something along these lines. Employ
ers would be "simply tax gatherers" from the public, who would pay the cost
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of workers' compensation through higher prices. 23 This made the no-fault
alternative to tort tolerable.
However, a public insurance scheme did not resolve employer concerns
completely. First, an insurance scheme with standardized premiums created
its own collective action problems, in particular the possibility of free-riding
employers seeking to gain a competitive advantage by underinvesting in
safety, as they would not have to bear the full cost of their accidents. The
problem of policing free riders was partly addressed by health and safety
legislation that required employers to meet public standards, but enforce
ment was generally lax. So other steps were taken. Some provision was made
for premiums to be adjusted through merit rating, although these powers
were little used initially because of their inconsistency with the principle of
collective liability.24 The other legislative measure provided for the creation
of German-style industry safety associations funded by workers' compensa
tion premiums. These associations were given the authority to promulgate
and enforce rules, as well as to educate their members, thereby lowering
information costs about risk reduction and providing a mechanism to po
lice employers whose hazardous practices threatened to increase everyone's
premiums. 25
But the politics of class compromise do not tell the whole story. Em
ployer acceptance of no-fault workers' compensation insurance can also be
traced to a more general change in thinking about the causes of workplace
injuries. While nineteenth-century market liberalism embraced notions of
individual responsibility, increasingly in the twentieth century statistical
thinking about accidents began to predominate. Work injuries were seen
as a predictable result of engaging in productive activity. As I.M. Rubinow
noted in his early treatise on social insurance, "'an industrial accident is not
an accident at all: Rather, it is a definite and constant characteristic of mod
ern industry, subject to definite rules and laws:' 26 As such, the search for in
dividual fault seemed misguided as a basis on which to award compensation
to workers who predictably suffered disabling injuries.
The retreat from individual fault paralleled and complemented an ide
ological shift away from laissez-faire principles and practices. One of the
most striking examples of this change comes from an unsigned article pub
lished in 1910 in the Labour Gazette, a monthly publication of the federal
Department of Labour, on the topic of workmen's compensation:
The basic fact from which legislation of the class specifically designated
as "Labour Legislation" proceeds is that labour, though bought and sold,
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is not a "commodity" in the ordinary sense of the term, inasmuch as its
purchase and sale always involve in the most intimate way the welfare of
a human being ... The securing of the comprehensive body of legislation
of this class ... marks the overthrow of the economic doctrine of laissez
faire ... the effect of which was to minimize or abolish the distinction
between labour and other commodities and to leave the condition of the
labourer to be determined almost wholly by competition and the law of
supply and demand. 27
Karl Polanyi could not have said it better. Clearly, one of the most dysfunc
tional consequences of unchecked commodification was the adverse effect
of work injuries and disability on the family wage system.
But to what extent did workers' compensation decommodify labour?
Here we need to return to the distinction between conflict over the price
of work-related disability and conflict over labour's commodity status. Em
ployers were deeply concerned about both issues. In regard to price, even
though the no-fault regime took compensation costs out of competition,
employers still had a collective interest in holding down the system's costs.
Employers understood that even if, in principle, the public would pay, con
sumer demand for most products was elastic and at some point higher
prices would noticeably reduce consumption levels. Moreover, even in the
early twentieth century Ontario producers in some sectors were competing
with out-of-province and international producers, who were not covered
by the provincial scheme and whose compensation costs could be lower.
Thus, compensation costs were not fully taken out of competition. It was
also crucial to employers that the boundaries of the system be maintained
so that only costs associated with work injuries would be compensated,
otherwise employers and consumers would be "unfairly" burdened with the
cost of benefits that should be paid out of general revenues if they were to
be provided at all.28
Measures to address these concerns included a wage-replacement rate of
55 percent, capping insurable earnings at $2,000, and imposing a seven-day
waiting period before benefits were payable. Employers also pushed for em
ployees to pay part of the premium, but Meredith held firm, arguing that
workers already contributed by the restrictions placed on the amount of
their compensation.
Employers were equally concerned about anything in the system that
might weaken labour's commodity status or the work incentive. There
fore, injured workers should be given neither the permission nor the
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means to stay out of the labour market longer than was absolutely neces
sary for them to recover. Thus, benefit levels were not just a cost issue
but also went to employers' interest in maintaining workers' labour mar
ket dependency. 29
Disagreements over price and commodification sometimes played them
selves out in debates about whether workers' compensation was "social
legislation:' For example, workers argued for minimum compensation lev
els regardless of income in order to keep workers and their families out of
poverty, something that previous regimes had failed to do. 30 Meredith was
sympathetic to this concern: "I suppose everybody recognizes, at least I cer
tainly do, that this Bill is more than a mere compensation to workmen Bill.
It is social legislation and it is intended to provide for the workman and save
the community from bearing the burden of his impairment:' 31 However,
apart from funeral expenses in the case of fatal accidents, Meredith was
adamantly opposed to minimum entitlements, even for dependent spouses
and children. 32
Common interests coalesced around the basic principle of a public,
compulsory, no-fault workers' compensation (WC) system. The benefit to
workers was the certainty of a modest entitlement to compensation, even
though they lost the right to sue employers for potentially greater sums
where employer negligence caused the injury. For employers, the WC sys
tem promised to remove a source of worker discontent, standardize the cost
of workplace injuries within industries at modest levels, and mal<e insur
ance more efficient by increasing the percentage of premiums that went to
injured workers.
But the system also built in conflicts that could only be managed, not
resolved. One endemic conflict was over the level of compensation. Work
ers had an interest in increasing benefit levels to improve their standard
of living after a disabling injury, while employers had an interest in lim
iting them to contain costs. The scheme set out a replacement rate and
capped insurable earnings, but there was nothing sacred about these de
terminations. Inflation would inevitably eat away at the earnings cap, so
that over time workers would demand that the cap be increased just to
retain the value of the coverage. Employer resistance to more generous
benefits went beyond their economic cost and reflected a concern that
higher compensation levels would weaken workers' incentive to return to
the labour market.
Another structural conflict revolved around how workers with per
manent disabilities would be compensated. The scheme was based on the
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principle that workers were to be partially compensated for their lost earn
ing capacity. But how was that loss to be calculated? From the employers'
perspective, permanently disabled workers should be compensated only for
the percentage of lost earning capacity directly caused by the injury. This
portion could be permanently retired and excused from the labour market.
The remaining capacity, however, had to remain commodified and active in
the labour market. Therefore, any additional problems the worker experi
enced in selling his or her residual labour power was non-compensable, as
it could be affected by factors such as the unemployment rate, a problem
outside the scheme. Workers regarded the distinction between the retired
and the active portion of labour power as entirely artificial, as it overlooked
the reality that the worker was still a whole human being and that the dam
aged portion of his or her capacity could not be neatly severed without af
fecting residual earning power. Regardless of the prevailing labour market
conditions, workers with disabilities attributed their difficulty in finding
employment to the work injury and demanded full compensation for their
wage loss until they found work that, with their compensation, returned
them to their pre-injury income.
We can see that workers with permanent impairments grasped in
tuitively that disability was socially constructed by political economic
relations - that, under capitalism, a worker with an impairment was dis
advantaged when seeking to find employment, as a result of employers' ex
pectations that workers with impairments would be less productive than
able-bodied workers, that they would be more prone to re-injury, or that
they would require some accommodation to be able to perform their jobs.
Workers with impairments knew from experience that, even at marginally
lower wage rates, they faced discrimination in the capitalist labour market
because employers anticipated that less surplus value could be extracted
from them. 33
The no-fault compensation system coalesced workers' and employers'
distinct collective interests but the strength of those collective interests, as
well as the capacity to act collectively, varied over tim:e.34 Space does not
permit a more comprehensive historical examination of how these con
tradictions played out in the Ontario WC regime; however, a focus on the
compensation of workers with permanent disabilities provides a good lens
through which to view the recurring dilemmas within the regime.
The original 1914 Workmen's Compensation Act mandated a wage-loss
system for compensating workers with permanent disabilities. According
to that model, a Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB; the name was
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changed to the Workers' Compensation Board in 1981 and to the Work
place Safety and Insurance Board [WSIB] in 1998) determined a compen
sation benefit solely by calculating the wage loss caused by the injury, not
taking into account any "social" factors that might make the worker less
employable and result in additional wage losses. This approach was con
sistent with insurance and commodification principles, but it was difficult
to administer: it required not only isolating the portion of the loss due
exclusively to the injury, which was difficult, but also ongoing monitoring
of workers' future earnings to determine whether the wage loss was con
tinuing. In 1917 the statute was amended to permit the board to adopt a
rating system based on a "meat chart" that established the percentage of
wage loss associated with the loss of a body part or a capacity. This too was
a way of commodifying the loss suffered by the worker, but it was admin
istratively simpler and provided rough justice in that it ignored the fact
the same loss of capacity did not affect the wage earnings of all workers
equally as the "meat chart" provided. 35
Standardized calculations of wage loss did not satisfactorily resolve the
issue for labour, which continued to demand full compensation for the ac
tual wages lost. Labour movement pressure during the Great Depression in
the 1930s led a number of provincial governments to appoint commissions
to investigate WC and make recommendations. 36 In Ontario, the commis
sion was headed by Justice W.E. Middleton, who made his perspective clear:
"The whole scheme of the Act and the principle underlying it is in the nature
of insurance:' Thus any proposal inconsistent with insurance principles was
rejected. This sealed the fate of labour's demand that workers with perma
nent partial disabilities be fully compensated, despite Middleton's recogni
tion that workers with permanent disabilities were disadvantaged in the
labour market: "[T]oo frequently this condition is accentuated by general
industrial conditions and it seems inequitable to place any burden of un
employment insurance upon the industries concerned under the guise of
workmen's compensation:' 37
Middleton's report did not satisfy the labour movement, but it was not
until the Second World War when labour militancy reached unprecedented
levels that it gained the political clout necessary to get the government
to enact legislation partially responsive to its concerns. In 1942, the On
tario government amended the Act to empower the compensation board
to award additional benefits to permanently injured workers if the board
believed that would be more equitable than the rating system. 38 However,
the board was not required to award additional benefits, and so the labour
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movement continued to press the issue in the postwar era, albeit with
limited success. The Roach Commission, appointed in 1950, reiterated the
position of the Middleton Commission, as did the McGillvray Commission
report seventeen years later. Both reports took the position that high unem
ployment among disabled workers was a problem for the welfare system to
39

address, not for WC.
In the late 1960s, the rise of a militant injured workers' movement, centred among Italian immigrants in Toronto, altered the political context of
the commodification-decommodification dialectic, giving workers' com
40
pensation issues unprecedented political traction. Initially,_the board ex
panded rehabilitation services in an effort to address the senous problems
workers with disabilities experienced re-entering the labour market, but
this strategy met with limited success. In the face of this reality, it became
increasingly difficult to uphold the distinction between compensating only
for the functional loss and not for the real labour market impact of the
impairment. Under growing pressure, in 1974 the Ontario government
amended the Act to give the board the power to award benefit supplements
to injured workers who returned to work for less than their _pre-injury
earnings. As well, those who did not return to work coul~ contmue t~ re
ceive full benefits unless they failed to cooperate in a medical or vocat10nal
41
rehabilitation program or did not accept suitable work that was available.
The legislation was amended one year later to permit the board to provide
supplemental benefits to workers with permanent partial disabilities when
the impairment of earning capacity was significantly greater than normal,
provided the worker participated in a program of medical or vocational
rehabilitation or accepted or was willing to take an available job that the
42

board deemed suitable.
In the years that followed, injured workers fought with the board to be
awarded these new supplemental benefits and met with some success. Im
proved benefits for injured workers, however, increased the cos.ts of_com
pensation and raised employer premiums, which attracted the attent10n of
employers, who mobilized and pressed their concerns before the board and
the government. In response to these pressures, the compensation board
commissioned a report from private consultants, which found that more
generous benefits were reducing the incentive to return to work. The WCB
followed up with its own paper, which valorized employers' concerns_t~at
rising compensation costs were making Ontario industry uncompetitive.
The politics of decommodification and price were clearly engaged. As a
solution, the WCB paper proposed a dual award system that would more

accurately compensate permanently injured workers· for their "real" wage
loss. Robert Elgie, the minister of labour, then commissioned Harvard law
professor and former chair of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board
Paul Weiler to undertake a system review.43
Weiler stepped into an "unhappily polarized" environment marked by
"incipient class struggle" over workers' compensation. 44 In his 1980 report,
he made a number of recommendations that workers supported, but the
recommendation that attracted the most attention and antipathy from in
jured workers was the dual award system, which would see permanently
injured workers receive a lump-sum payment that acknowledged their
non-economidosses and an ongoing payment tied to actual wage loss. This
approach would replace the rating system, which had only recently been
amended to enable more disabled workers to get supplemental benefits.
Workers feared that a return to the wage-loss system, abandoned by the
board in 1917, would lead to benefits being reduced if the WCB deemed
that a worker could earn an income from a suitable job, even if a suitable
job was not available. Employers were more favourably inclined towards the
proposal, but they were worried that the board might not take into account
labour market conditions in calculating actual wage loss, especially in the
context of a recession.
The twisted politics that followed cannot be fully recounted here but, in
a nutshell, while the Ontario government did not immediately implement
the wage-loss plan, it did make other changes, including higher wage re
placement levels, more vocational rehabilitation, and an independent ap
peal tribunal. Employers became even more alarmed that the workers' com
pensation system was being incrementally transformed into a social welfare
program that enabled injured workers to remain outside the labour market
and gave them access to generous social services, driving up the cost of the
system. 4 " They were supported by a 1987 KPMG report, which found that
real claim costs had indeed increased and singled out supplemental ben
efits as the most significant contributor to the rising cost per claim.46 In
June 1988, the government introduced Bill 162, which would implement the
dual award system recommended by Weiler but which also would provide
injured workers with a limited right to be reinstated to their old jobs. In
announcing the Bill, the minister emphasized that its goal was to tie com
pensation more closely to economic losses and help injured workers return
to the workforce. 47 Both workers and employers were wary of how it would
be implemented, but eventually the employers were won over and the Bill
was enacted in 1989.48
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There is relatively little research on the impact of the Bill 162 reforms
on compensation costs, but there is some evidence that it failed to produce
the cost savings employers wanted, largely because its implementation
occurred under a New Democratic Party (NDP) government, which was
elected in 1990.49 As a result, the WCB was reluctant to reduce econom
ic loss benefits by deeming workers able to earn a wage even though they
were not employed. 50 The defeat of the NDP government in 1995 and its
replacement by an ideologically right-leaning Conservative Party opened
the door for change, especially given the strong employer demand for the
costs of the system to be reined in. 51 The government enacted legislation
in 1997 that prioritized returning injured workers to work, either with the
employer where the injury occurred or through a labour market re-entry
(LMR) plan. 52
There were numerous problems with this approach, including an annual
review of loss of earnings (LOE) benefits for six years after the injury, but
one consequence was that, after workers completed the LMR program, they
were deemed capable of earning a wage, and their loss of earnings compen
sation was reduced accordingly, even if no suitable job was available. Many
disabled workers suffered benefit cuts as result, as LMR programs were of
ten of poor quality, and only about half of all workers who completed these
53

programs found employment.
In 2004, a Liberal government took office. Legislative reform of workers'
compensation was not high on its list of priorities, but in 2007 it remov~d
the word "deem'' from the Act and reinserted the requirement that a smt
able job had to be "available" before workers could have their LOE benefits
reduced.s4 Yet, despite this change, injured workers continue to have their
LOE benefits cut. 55
The WSIB (renamed from WCB) subsequently launched a Benefits Policy
Review Consultation, chaired by Jim Thomas. In his 2013 report, he refers
back to his earlier involvement in workers' compensation issues in the 1980s
and 1990s:
I recall it was impossible to find enough common gro~nd within the stake
holder community to move forward with benefits policy reforms. It would
appear that little has changed since then. Stakeholder opposition, stem
ming from the fact that what is a "win" for injured workers is an additional
cost for employers,and vice versa, has thwarted attempts at reforming benefit policies.

He goes on to bemoan this state of affairs and express the beliefthat "a principle
based approach to benefits policy might be a key to unlock the paralysis that
has occurred over decades of failed attempts at policy reform:' 56
Thomas's report did result in a policy change by the board, but one that
was deeply controversial. Effective November 1, 2014, the board's policy
on pre-existing conditions changed to give adjudicators greater scope to
reduce benefits for permanently injured workers who had a pre-existing
condition, even if that condition had not been adversely affecting their
ability to work prior to the accident. Not surprisingly, injured worker ad~
vocates have denounced the policy change as a betrayal of a foundational
principle of workers' compensation law: that all workers are entitled to
the full benefit of the law without discrimination based on their physical
condition. 57
This brief history of workers' compensation in Ontario demonstrates the
strength of the commodification-decommodification dialectic as a driving
force in producing the recurring regulatory dilemmas that are endemic to this
area of law. Workers' interests in challenging their commodity status or de
manding a greater share of socially produced wealth, in this case by insisting
on being fully compensated for their work injuries, runs into capital's interest
in maintaining labour market discipline and maximizing profit by extract
ing surplus value. The politics of the commodification-decommodifi.cation
dialectic vary, as does the intensity of conflict. There have been moments
when workers successfully mobilized, sometimes attracting the support of
reformers concerned about the dysfunctional consequences of gloves-off
capitalism on social reproduction, but the current turn of governments
towards austerity politics has penetrated the workers' compensation sys
tem, shifting the focus to cost containment at the expense of benefits for in
jured workers generally, and especially those with permanent work-related
disabilities.
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